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Foreword
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) started a research activity on the behavior of Rus-
sian enterprises under liberalization, privatization and restructuring in 1995{1996. This
activity originated upon the initiative of the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Fed-
eration. The major reason for focusing on this subject was the fact that the current
state and further transformation of Russian medium and large sized enterprises became
a challenge for the continuation and success of transition related reforms. Despite cer-
tain positive tendencies, numerous enterprises still adjust themselves to ongoing changes
without considerable market adaptation and modernization. The emerging ownership
structure and nancial markets demonstrate limited positive inuence on stockholders'
incentives, decision-making process and strategies of restructuring.
In the course of these enterprise studies, a workshop on \Russian Enterprises on the
Path of Market Adaptation and Restructuring" was organized at IIASA on 1{3 February
1996. Russian and Western experts, extensively working in the area of enterprise perfor-
mance under transition, focused the discussions on recent empirical ndings and analyses
concerning the following issues: typical models of enterprise behavior; development of the
nancial situation at the enterprises and its determinants; impact of emerging markets
and competition on enterprises; the consequences of privatization and patterns of restruc-
turing; and enterprise social assets divestiture and conversion. The workshop arrived at
both analytical conclusions and recommendations for policy measures stimulating \con-
structive" enterprise behavior. Possibilities for a joint research project on the motivations
and behavior of enterprises in transition economies were also discussed.
The circulation of selected workshop papers as IIASAWorking Papers is undertaken in
order to provoke broad discussions of presented analytical results. Drs. Lev M. Freinkman
and Irina Starodubrovskaya describe in this paper the scope of the enterprise social assets
restructuring problem, the major factors which inuence this process and the consequences
of social assets divestiture for both enterprises and local communities.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya

1 Introduction
The problem of enterprise social assets is one of the key issues of enterprise restructuring.
Wide provision of social services is the type of activity which diverts enterprises from
their core business. Additional nancial and administrative costs associated with social
functions prevent enterprises from being competitive. Social assets are considered as
additional burden for external investors who refrain from investments in enterprises with
large social liabilities. Besides, in cases when large potentially insolvent enterprises provide
a number of social services to their communities, it increases the bargaining power of such
uncompetitive enterprises. This makes it very dicult to start bankruptcy procedures
against them, and nally it forces the state to support inecient allocation of resources.
Users of enterprise social services are often not protected enough from arbitrary actions
of enterprise managers and general deterioration in the level of providing services.
Downsizing of enterprises' social activities means that some other agents would have to
perform these functions instead. That is why the issue of enterprise social assets is not only
one of the crucial components of enterprise restructuring, but is also closely connected with
both public sector reforms and social sector restructuring. There are a number of purposes
for public sector's involvement in substituting enterprise social functions: (i) protection of
some critical elements of public consumption (e.g., kindergartens), which might otherwise
disappear due to reductions in enterprises' funding; (ii) facilitating reforms in housing as
well as in delivering some public services (e.g., health services), which would be easier if all
corresponding public assets were concentrated under the single management of municipal

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governments; (iii) provision of more equal access for citizens to some important public
services, because social activities of enterprises are sometimes delivered at a much higher
and sometimes at a much lower level, than the public ones; (iv) nancial savings through
better utilization of economy of scale (closure of excessive units, better management,
etc.). At the same time, the former enterprise social assets can be either privatized or
used for the introduction of new institutional forms in the public sector, as they are not
necessarily to be transferred to existing governance structures and to fall under the control
of prevailing system of interests. So, they can be pioneers in social sector restructuring
and, therefore, might facilitate social sector reforms in general.
While the importance of this problem for the Russian economy has been widely rec-
ognized (World Bank, 1994), very little empirical analysis has been done in this area
until recently. Now the situation began to change. Among the recently prepared most
detailed studies one can mention the paper written by Simon Commander and Une Lee
(Commander and Lee, 1995) devoted to the scope of social benets which are typically
provided by Russian rms, as well as the Report on Russian Enterprise Housing Divesti-
ture prepared by the group of experts from the Urban Institute (Urban Institute, 1995).
Both these papers are based on enterprise surveys and interviews. Besides, a few studies
of the problem with enterprise social assets also has been started recently with respect to
other countries of the former Soviet Union (ADB & Associates Ltd., 1995; Cheasty, 1996;
O'Keefe, 1995).
This paper is based on some additional sources of information, which include various
macro and sectoral data provided by Goskomstat and the Ministry of Economy of the
Russian Federation and the data collected in the course of preparation of the World Bank
Enterprise Housing Divestiture Project (EHDP).
1
Specically, the survey of 24 enterprises
took place in 10 cities at the end of 1994{beginning of 1995. Respective municipalities
were also surveyed. Although the survey was more directed to enterprise housing issues,
the problems of other social assets and benets were also taken into account. Additional
information on the legal and nancial framework of enterprise social assets functioning
and divestiture was collected from 11 cities competed for participation in the project
through a number of interviews with city ocials and enterprise managers.
The paper has the following structure. The second section describes the major trends
in overall enterprise social spending over 1992{94. Major factors inuencing restructuring
of enterprise social assets, among which macroeconomic, legal and nancial parameters,
are discussed in section 3. Section 4 provides a brief summary of major potential directions
of such restructuring: they include new reformed forms of enterprise control over social
assets, divestiture and privatization. Sections 5 and 6 discuss potential consequences,
rstly nancial impact, of social asset divestiture on correspondingly enterprises and mu-
nicipalities. Section 7 is focused on barriers for divestiture, while the remaining section
provides some recommendations to facilitate the divestiture process. A more detailed
1
This information was partly used in the paper by S. Commander and U. Lee mentioned above.
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description of the enterprise sample is presented in Annex 1. Annex 2 lists major govern-
ment regulatory acts, which govern the divestiture process in Russia. Annex 3 describes
peculiarities of providing social services by enterprises in two specic sectors, agriculture
and coal. Annex 4 presents a case study of the Vladimir Tractor Plant, which demon-
strates the scale of potential benets from divestiture for a typical Russian enterprise in
manufacturing.
2 The Scope of the Problem
This section provides some macro estimates concerning the overall scale of Russian en-
terprises' involvement in delivering social services. One might argue that while being
quite substantial, enterprise social spending are still much below some earlier provided
estimates derived from the small enterprise surveys. In particular, such spending neither
make the level of 15% of GDP (Alm and Sjoquist, 1993) nor amount to 40% of the wage
bill (Commander and Jackman, 1993).
Table 1 provides some estimates of the value of social assets being at the disposal of
Russian enterprises before the process of their divestiture has been intensied in 1994.
By the end of 1993, total social assets amounted to 5% percent of the total xed capital
assets accumulated by the enterprise sector. Assets in housing and utilities made two
thirds of this total, and assets in education and health amounted to more than 20% of
the total social assets. The data is derived from Goskomstat's regular annual statistics
(form No. 11). Due to high ination in Russia and because of the unsatisfactory way,
in which the accumulated stock of xed capital has been re-estimated, the quality of the
provided data is not very high. In particular, the data are not comparable across the
stock (accumulated social assets) and ow (new construction of social assets in 1992{93)
variables. Despite these deciencies, this information might be useful for considering the
structure of the social assets accumulated stock. Table 1 also suggests that divestiture
was very slow in both 1992 and 1993.
Total social spending by the enterprise sector, as reported by Goskomstat,
2
amounted
to about 3.1% of GDP in 1993 and 3.5% in 1994. In 1993{94 social spending decreased
by 30% in real terms compared to its 1992 level. Enterprises did not make any additional
reductions in real social spending in 1994 while some divestiture of social assets had
been happening during this year despite the general deterioration of the overall nancial
position of the enterprise sector. As a result, social spending in 1994 constituted a much
larger share of gross prot in the economy than it was in 1993. About 30% of the overall
1994 social expenditures was spent on housing maintenance, 22% on education and health
services, and about a quarter on new investments in social assets (Table 2). More than
60% of the total amount in 1993{94 was spent by industrial enterprises, employing less
than 30% of the total Russian labor force (Table 3).
2
The numbers are derived from Goskomstat's ocial publication (form No. 10f) of nancial indicators
for various sectors in the Russian economy. The quality of these data is discussed below.
3
Enterprise social spending as a whole was the equivalent to a little more than 25%
of the total consolidated budget spending on social purposes and housing in 1993.
3
This
share dropped to 22% in 1994 due to some relative decline in enterprise spending on both
housing and health. The enterprises' contribution to nancing housing maintenance was
equivalent to almost 30% of the actual budgetary spending on this purpose in 1993 and
it amounted to 23% in 1994.
The data show some increase in social spending as a share of the total labor costs.
In 1993, the total registered social spending by enterprises amounted to 17% of the total
wage bill
4
(in industry | 22%) and to 13% of the total labor costs estimated as a sum
of the wage bill and the payroll tax (in industry | 18%). In 1994, these shares for the
economy as a whole amounted to 20 and 15% correspondingly (Table 3). This aggregate
data is consistent with the results of the large enterprise survey. As was shown by the
World Bank survey of 420 industrial rms held in summer 1994, average per capita social
spending in this sample were equivalent to 18% of the wage bill, and this social spending
was positively and signicantly correlated with the average cash wage. According to this
survey, very few rms, only about 5% of the sample, did not provide any social services,
while more than 60% provided ve or more various types of such services (Commander
and Lee, 1995).
The data suggest that 1994 social spending in industry as a percentage of the cash
wages returned to its traditional pre-reform level exceeding 20%:
5
overall reduction in
real enterprise social spending over the years of reforms did not exceed the decline in real
cash wages. This makes a dramatic contrast to Poland, where the initial pre-reform level
of social spending, of 6%, was as much as 3 times lower, and it has been showing some
moderate decline since reforms started (Schaer, 1995).
2.1 Under-reporting
The presented data on the total enterprise social expenditure are likely to be signicantly
under-reported. This happens: (i) because of insucient enterprise coverage in Goskom-
stat form No. 10f used for relevant calculations (see Tables 2 and 3) and, especially, (ii)
due to statistical biases in the data provided by enterprises.
(i) While the annual form 10f is supposed to cover the whole enterprise sector, as it
follows from the employment data, in 1994, Goskomstat was able to collect this
form only from enterprises with total employment of about 85% of the overall labor
force. However, one might assume that most of the largest enterprises, being the
main providers of social services, are covered by this form, and therefore the above
3
This excludes transfers from extra-budgetary funds, i.e., government expenditures on social
protection.
4
Including bonuses from prot.
5
Estimated on the basis of: Finance in the Russian Federation, 1992, M: Goskomstat, 1993, p. 30;
Russian Federation in 1992, Statistical Handbook, M: Goskomstat, 1993, p. 121, 224.
4
mentioned under-reporting is not very large. Small rms, in particular, those newly
emerged private businesses, are much likely to be under-presented in Goskomstat
data but this part of the enterprise sector is less involved in delivering social services.
(ii) A number of reasons, such as widespread barter transactions; the delivery of goods
and services to employees at low prices; exclusion of depreciation and costs of renting
corresponding premises from the total costs related to the provision of social ser-
vices, etc., make the reported social spending volume substantially under-estimated.
Enterprise managers had and still have incentives | e.g., because of the excess wage
tax | to include some actual expenditures made in the social sphere into their gen-
eral production costs by using deciencies of the existing accounting classications.
In addition, most social services are provided by enterprises on a non-prot basis,
so the opportunity costs of getting the same services through independent providers
might be higher. Therefore, the actual burden of all types of social nancing for en-
terprises is probably higher than that reported by Goskomstat but it hardly exceeds
4% of GDP.
2.2 Over-reporting
There are also certain incentives for enterprises to over-report their social spending in
order increase their benets from available tax deductions. At the same time, it is very
dicult to control the actual allocation of funds between production and social purposes
within enterprises. Some types of costs are not even formally accounted for. For example,
in our survey, a number of enterprises could not report their costs of heat supply for
enterprise housing because they are not accounted separately from the costs of heat used
for production purposes. So, funds, which are reported to be spent on social activities,
can actually be easily used for production needs. However, as it seems, the overall volume
of such over-reporting is lower than the under-reporting discussed above.
3 Factors Which Inuence Social Assets
Restructuring
The main groups of factors which inuence the process of social assets restructuring are:
the external economic conditions and the internal situation of the enterprise. Among the
external factors one can identify macroeconomic environment, legal framework, nancial
framework and attitude of local authorities. The internal situation is determined rst of
all by the nancial state of the enterprise and the standpoint of enterprise management
on the role and further destiny of social assets.
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3.1 Macroeconomic environment
Macroeconomic policy aects seriously the process of enterprise adjustment in general
and restructuring of social assets in particular. Tightening enterprise budget constraints
as a part of successful stabilization eorts substantially accelerates overall reductions in
enterprise social spending, including spending cuts by those enterprises which are doing
quite well and do not experience severe nancial problems. On the other hand, when
the government's nancial policy is soft and progress with enterprise reform is slow, even
enterprises, which, at all accounts, are in a poor nancial shape, might be able to continue
nancing social services through the accumulation of arrears to suppliers and to the
budget, getting soft government credits or other forms of implicit government subsidies.
Ukraine might be considered as a good example of the latter situation. According to
IMF, Ukrainian enterprises spent on social activities about 4.6% of GDP in 1994, i.e.,
measured as a share of GDP as much as they did before reforms have started (Cheasty,
1996). The opposite case, with some reservations, might be found in Kyrgyzstan, where,
as a result of the strong stabilization program, most enterprise non-housing social facilities
were just shut down (ADB & Associates Ltd., 1995).
6
It seems that enterprises in Russia,
as well as in Kazakhstan (O'Keefe, 1995), implemented in 1993{94, on the average, a sort
of intermediary strategy to compare to both Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Some reduction in
social spending has happened, and some social facilities have been closed. But the scale
was much smaller than it had been initially expected. The reason for this can be found
in quite inconsistent economic policies conducted in these countries.
General institutional changes can seriously aect enterprise social assets restructuring
as well. The role of privatization and improvement of corporate governance mechanisms
are very important in this regard. At the advanced enterprise reform stage and under
transparent ownership rights, the continuation of social subsidies at the traditional level,
even if they are possible nancially, will become institutionally unacceptable.
One might draw some important conclusions from this cross country analysis. In
particular, though cuts in enterprise spending in Russia are so far quite moderate, it
6
Unfortunately, there is little evidence regarding the changes in enterprise social spending that hap-
pened in transition economies of Eastern Europe. Only the Polish experience is relatively well documented
(Estrin, Schaer and Singh, 1995). Given the radical nature of Polish stabilization, one might expect a
quite substantial reduction in social spending by Polish rms. However, the paper by Estrin, Schaer and
Singh (1995) suggests that this did not happen. It is not clear if this should be considered as an argument
against our hypothesis that successful stabilization plays a crucial role for accelerating the decline in so-
cial expenditures of enterprises. Despite a very sound macroeconomic policy, Polish economy has been
characterized by a number of features, which unavoidably prevent enterprises from full and immediate
discontinuation of social services delivery. The following factors are probably of major importance: (i)
quite low initial, i.e., pre-reform, level of enterprise social spending; (ii) powerful labor unions (especially
in privatized rms); (iii) eective government regulation of cash wage increases (popivek). Thus, the
Polish developments, as it seems, neither contradicts nor conrms our explanations of the variation in
enterprise social spending patterns observed across FSU countries.
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might change dramatically as soon as, due to the strengthening of the government's reform
eorts, enterprise expectations regarding \prevailing rules of the game" are modied.
3.2 Legal framework
Legal arrangements for the status of enterprise social assets in Russia were determined rst
of all by the Federal Government for enterprises being in the process of corporatization
and privatization (Annex 2). They varied across dierent types of social assets. A part
of social assets (like health, educational, cultural and sport facilities) was allowed to be
included in the charter capital of enterprises, with an obligation to keep the prole of these
assets unchanged. Another group of assets, which includes housing together with attached
utility networks (if they are not on the territory of enterprises), as well as maintenance
units of enterprises with all their so-called \material base" are prohibited to be included
into the charter capital and have to be mandatory divested to municipalities according
to the time schedule approved by municipal administrations but within six months after
privatization. Before divestiture happens, such assets are to be held on the balance sheets
of enterprises. At the same time, enterprises were not forced to have any social assets in
their property, if working collectives did not want to do so and did not intend to include
them in the privatization plan. In cases when some assets are located on the territory
of enterprises but are used for municipal needs, they have to be transformed into the
common property of privatizing enterprises and local authorities.
However, dierences in regional and local regulations concerning the operation and
funding of enterprise social assets play a major role in the determination of an actual legal
framework in this eld. There is a lot of evidence that federal norms (which themselves
are fragmentary and contradictory in many cases) are often either violated or ignored by
local authorities who actually set up their own \rules of the game" (Bim, 1994; Urban
Institute, 1995). For example, in some places local authorities insist that almost all social
assets could not be included into the charter capital of privatized enterprises, while in
other locations the process was mainly determined by the decisions of working collectives
of privatizing enterprises.
Meanwhile, in those locations where local authorities are weak and enterprises are
strong, the federal rules are violated in a dierent way. For instance, in many cases heat
supply systems (boilers), which are located on the territory of enterprises, were included
into the charter capital and since that local authorities have had neither access to the
proper information on these boilers' activity (unit costs, technical characteristics) nor
power over the supply of heat to municipal housing and other social facilities. As a
result, heat taris for such heat enterprises are set at a too high level and the supply of
heat is unstable (when an enterprise needs more heat for production purposes it reduces
supply to residents). The ban to reprole social assets, which have been included into
the charter capitals of privatized enterprises, is also usually violated. In particular, a lot
of enterprise kindergartens were either reproled for commercial purposes or closed down
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after the enterprises were privatized (Bim, 1994). In some cases, those assets, which were
forbidden to be included into the charter capital (housing), were in practice privatized
along with the xed capital.
Arrangements concerning certain types of social assets are regulated by traditions. For
example, recurrent costs for enterprise medical units were traditionally nanced by mu-
nicipalities while enterprises had to compensate building maintenance and some overhead
costs, and such a practice remains unchanged in many localities.
Thus, \the rules of the game" for social assets restructuring are only partly regulated
by federal legislation which is not very consistent in itself. In general, the actual devel-
opments are mainly determined by the main players at regional and local levels: regional
authorities, municipal authorities and local enterprises, their balance of interests and rel-
ative bargaining power. Dierent fragments of federal regulation are used in dierent
places, while the rest is ignored. As a result, the legal regime for social assets restructur-
ing substantially diers both from federal rules and across municipalities. In the further
sections of the paper the discussion is focused not on the formal regulations but on the
real framework for social assets restructuring. Specically, local dierences seriously af-
fect nancial arrangements for both current operations and divestiture of enterprise social
assets.
3.3 Financial framework
Two main opposite views have been expressed regarding nancial consequences of enter-
prises' social functions. The rst more traditional one (Shleifer and Boycko, 1994) suggests
that nancial impact is quite negative and additional spending on social asset mainte-
nance and operations leads to comparative disadvantages for enterprises which hold social
assets versus those which are free of such obligations. The other position is that hold-
ing social assets does not aect too much the enterprises' nancial position (Teplukhin,
Halligan and Willer, 1995). According to our analysis, the actual picture varies from city
to city. This means, that on the basis of the general analysis of both legal and nancial
environment, it is impossible to determine the potential nancial impact of maintaining
social assets on the enterprises's nancial performance because specic nancial mecha-
nisms of compensating their social expenditures vary substantially across cities, and so
their consequences for enterprises can be quite dierent.
The major extra sources of funding for enterprises' social spending coverage have
been introduced by federal regulations and now are uniform almost everywhere: it is the
enterprises' right to deduct their social expenditures from both the prot tax (but not
more than 50% of the tax amount due) and from 1.5% local turnover tax, which can
be introduced (and actually is introduced now almost everywhere) by local governments
specically to nance housing and social facilities. However, the local implementation
of these federal guidance varies a lot across municipalities who use dierent options for
8
the regulation of the prot tax and the turnover tax deductions. The following types of
dierences can be mentioned.
1. By the way of how costs are credited against corresponding taxes:
(a) According to actual reported expenditures of enterprises;
(b) According to special norms established by municipality for housing and other
social assets maintenance and operations (for example, for housing they are
measured in \rubles per square meter"). These norms vary substantially across
regions, covering from as low as 40% of the actual costs up to 100%.
7
2. By the way of how tax credit mechanisms are established:
(a) Enterprises can credit their expenditures against appropriate taxes (according
to any of the mechanisms mentioned above), and if the amount of tax cred-
its is not sucient, local authorities (e.g., in Ryazan or Yaroslavl) reimburse
enterprises' additional spending.
(b) Enterprises can credit the entire volume of their expenditures against appro-
priate taxes (according to any of the mechanisms mentioned above in para. 1),
but if these tax credits are not enough to cover the full amount of spending,
the city contributes nothing to support the enterprise social activity.
(c) No transparent rules regarding the tax credit mechanism were set and local
authorities make individual decisions about tax deductions. For example, as
Volgograd ocials reported, there were no general rules for 1.5% turnover tax
benets in the city. In certain cases (for example, if an enterprise is loss-
maker or works for city needs), a decision might be made to use preferential
tax rates. Otherwise, an enterprise has to pay the full amount of the tax due,
independently of its actual social spending.
While both options (a) and (b) might be used in the framework of the existing
federal legislation, option (c) openly contradicts the federal law, according to which
social expenditures of enterprises should be deducted from the amount of 1.5% local
turnover tax.
3. By the way of how deductions from two dierent taxes are combined.
In most cities, but not everywhere, the mechanism works in a way that allows enter-
prises to benet twice from the same social spending. The turnover tax is paid before
the prot tax, so turnover tax payments automatically reduce prot tax liabilities (which
7
Besides, in some regions, local governments severely restrict the types of spending being eligible
for tax credits. For instance in Moscow oblast, enterprises' spending on heat and other utility services
delivered to enterprise housing is not covered by these benets. As a result, only about 20% of the actual
housing costs of local enterprises are credited against the corresponding taxes (Kalinina, 1995).
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makes, on average, the eective rate for enterprises equal to 2/3 of a statutory rate).
While enterprises decrease turnover tax payments by the amount of their social spend-
ing, they have a right to deduct the full amount of the turnover tax paid (according to a
statutory rate) in the process of calculating their prot tax obligations. From eleven cities
considered for participating in the World Bank Enterprise Housing Divestiture project,
eight conrmed that they have had this rule of double benets.
There are also some other sources of nancial support to enterprises in some cities. For
example, sometimes municipalities declare social assets to be divested from enterprises,
receive federal transfers to support these assets, and share these funds with enterprises,
which actually continue to have social assets on their balance. Such situations are possible,
as we will argue below, because the term \divestiture" is still poorly determined by the
federal regulations.
It is also worth mentioning that local authorities usually provide nancial benets
described above not only to enterprises maintaining and operating social assets being
kept on their balance, and which therefore are subject to divestiture, but they also do so
even when the corresponding social assets had been included into the charter capital of
privatized enterprises.
In some cases federal and regional budget transfers are allocated directly to enterprises.
In many rural settlements and one-enterprise towns, municipal governments still do not
have adequate administrative capacity to manage corresponding assets because in these
places historically the largest rms were providers of the bulk of social services. Due to
this tradition, the enterprises, not municipalities, continue to receive subsidies from both
federal and regional budgets and to run housing, schools, hospitals, kindergartens, etc.
Governmental transfers for social purposes are the most signicant in the agriculture,
coal, and defense industries (see Annex 3).
3.4 Attitude of local authorities
In general, city ocials are interested in delaying social assets divestiture for as long as
possible. It is especially true in regard to housing and utilities. According to the survey,
municipalities in about 60% of the cases try to delay or stop this process (Table 6). Nine
enterprises from ten, which have not started divestiture negotiations yet, foresee that
these negotiations would be very dicult because of certain conditions imposed by city
administration, that might be very hard for enterprises to fulll (in one case the city
was not intended to start negotiations at all). As a short-term solution, local authorities
often try to introduce agreements between enterprises and city administration on joint
use and nancing of social assets, which actually means that enterprises continue to hold
the whole nancial and management responsibility for the maintenance and operation of
social assets, while the city contributes from time to time some funds if they are available
(budgeted at the expense of federal transfers or from 1.5% turnover tax).
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However, in some cases, local authorities are very keen to receive the full control over
social assets in the city and to start developing and managing the city social infrastructure
as a single system. Therefore, they insist on social assets divestiture even if it means the
additional nancial burden for the city.
It would be very interesting to nd out whether there are any objective factors which
inuence the position of local authorities besides the personal inclinations of certain of-
cials. According to our experience within the Enterprise Housing Divestiture Project,
cities which are dominated by one or several large enterprises are on both extremes. In
such cities almost all the housing and other social assets used to be controlled by en-
terprises and, as a result, local authorities only recently were absolutely powerless and
depended completely in their social development upon investment decisions of enterprises.
City administrations in these cases either completely reject the transfer of responsibility
of managing social assets from enterprises or are much more radical in their support to
the divestiture than their colleagues from the other cities. In larger and more diversied
cities the picture is also diverse. For example, in the middle of 1995 the share of divested
enterprise housing in 12 cities, which were initially selected for EHDP, varied from almost
zero up to 95%. But in general, local authorities from middle-sized and even large cities
are overloaded by their nancial and managerial problems associated with existing mu-
nicipal social facilities and are quite reluctant to push for divestiture which is considered
as an additional burden.
3.5 Position of enterprise managers
It is quite clear that on the whole, with all other factors being equal, the more dicult is
the enterprise nancial situation is, the bigger the pressures are for social assets restruc-
turing. They are spelled out in various ways: a stronger pressure on local governments to
divest social assets, introduction of various service restrictions for non-employees, rising
cost-recovery through increases in user fees and taris, etc. Coopers & Lybrand (1995)
provides an example of the link between coal mine protability and the level of cost re-
covery in housing nanced by these mines. It shows, in particular, that in early 1995, the
protable mine was still capable of retaining its extremely low cost recovery in housing, at
the level of 7.4%. Meanwhile, the neighboring mine, which had heavy losses, was forced
to increase cost-recovery up to 34.4%.
At the same time, there are some general characteristics of the attitude of enterprise
managers towards social functions not explained by pure nancial reasons and having
more deep psychological and cultural roots.
In general, most of the enterprise managers participating in the survey assess social
functions as a signicant burden. But the attitude towards dierent kinds of social activ-
ities is the same. As one can see from Table 4, social functions associated with holding
social assets are considered by enterprise managers as the most dicult ones. Social func-
tions associated with provision of non-wage benets including those in kind but which
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do not require holding substantial social assets (e.g., food shops with subsidized prices,
transportation subsidies, direct distribution of commodities produced by the enterprise
itself or received through barter at subsidized prices) constitute a much less burden than
the former ones. For example, Table 4 shows that in general it is much more easy for en-
terprises to compensate their workers for resort recreation in cash than to hold recreation
facilities themselves.
In addition, there is a dierent attitude towards two dierent groups of social assets.
Kindergartens, housing and dormitories are considered as a major burden by a relatively
large group of the respondents and the further fate of these assets is now the most painful
issue for managers. But it is much easier for enterprises to continue holding such assets
as sport facilities, cultural centers, hospitals and clinics.
On the basis of this information, it seems enterprises should be very keen to get rid
of social assets, rst of all of those which constitute the main burden for them. However,
our survey at rst sight does not support this view. Only one out of 24 enterprises
reported that it planned to stop providing all social services and one more had a clear
strategy to make social activities self-nanced. The six others presented a sort of strategy
of social assets restructuring which can be considered as rational (meaning that these
enterprises intended to downsize or to increase cost recovery of those types of social
activities which are the most dicult for them to provide). The rest of the sample either
had no strategy at all or their strategy could not be considered as rational according to
the criterion mentioned above. Six enterprises were not going to change anything in their
social activities, and three were going to start providing new social services.
Such an outcome contradicts not only the results of the other studies in this area,
but also the answers to some other questions in our survey. For example, only two
enterprises reported that they were not interested in housing divestiture, and it means
that the others who insisted on preserving all social functions expressed their intentions
in a controversial way. But it seems this phenomena has a psychological explanation and
corresponds to traditional paternalistic attitude of Soviet enterprise managers towards
working collectives. Even if in reality managers take some actions to get rid of social assets
they do not consider it as appropriate to admit that they are going to leave their workers
without social support from the enterprise, at least without some forms of this support.
This outcome is consistent with the results of the large World Bank enterprise survey
where more than half of the managers of responding rms explained their continuation
social benets provision by non-economic factors (Commander and Lee, 1995). Certain
objective reasons are denitely behind such social and ethical preferences of enterprise
managers, among which the necessity to preserve good relations with local and regional
authorities seems to play the key role. Thus as managers have quite controversial feelings
about divestiture, it is not surprising that their practical steps towards transferring social
assets would not be very consistent and active, and they could be easily blocked by local
authorities.
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4 Possible Ways of Social Assets Restructuring
4.1 Options available
There are three possible solutions to the problem of enterprise social assets. Enterprise
social assets can: (i) be kept by enterprises with or without changes in principles of
their utilization, nancing and ownership; (ii) be divested to municipalities for further
privatization; (iii) be divested to municipalities to be kept in municipal ownership for a
while.
A signicant portion of the entire social assets has been included into the founding
capital of the former state owned enterprises and privatized together with their produc-
tive assets. Insiders consider (or at least used to consider)
8
such privatization deals as
benecial for themselves because they see future protable opportunities of either using
or selling this real estate. It was a voluntary action by insiders to take responsibility for
maintaining these assets, and therefore there is no reason for the government now both
to consider plans of their divestiture and to continue subsidization of their maintenance,
including implicit subsidization through tax benets. Among the social assets, which have
been most frequently involved in privatization, are sport, recreation and entertainment
facilities. The costs of their maintenance might amount up to 25% of the current total
costs of maintaining enterprise social assets (see Annex 4).
According to the survey, enterprises consider dierent possibilities of how to use social
assets being at their disposal, including downsizing certain activities and making them
self-nancing. Among the ways to increase cost recovery, the most popular is to attract
new clients from non-employees and to increase user fees for them. The possibilities to
increase fees from the enterprise employees and to reprole and commercially use some
social assets are also under consideration though less frequently.
In those cases when enterprises are keen to divest their facilities in e.g., entertainment
or other non-core social activities, the government should support this transfer, while it
must not accept responsibility for these assets. Instead of this, the government has to
develop and execute a privatization plan for corresponding assets based on the general
principles of the Russian privatization program. This possibility is envisaged in Russian
legislation (Annex 2).
However, there is a big volume of social assets which either (i) can not legally be
included into the charter capital of privatized enterprises or (ii) were not included for
some reasons at the time of privatization and (iii) immediate privatization of which is
not quite reasonable. We are going to argue that the best option for this kind of social
assets in most cases would be divestiture to local authorities. While housing and utilities
8
Sometimes when the owners change their mind, they manage to make a deal with the local admin-
istration and sell these social assets to the city at symbolic very cheap prices, but in other cases they
have to suer from the results of their previous decisions regarding privatization, which proved to be
unprotable.
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constitute the largest portion of such assets, the same is also true for some educational
and medical facilities.
4.2 Why divestiture, not privatization?
There are a number of reasons why, for certain types of social assets, immediate wide-
scale privatization is hardly feasible and not very ecient. This issue is discussed below
using the example of housing and supporting utility networks, where most problems are
concentrated, but the same factors are also aecting, though to a smaller extent, some
other types of social assets.
(i) Legal regulation. Legislation on the privatization of apartments in Russia was formed
in a way which is not very favorable for the emergence of ecient private owners.
Tenants can not be enforced to privatize their apartments because privatization is
considered as a voluntary action which can happen any time in future and, mean-
while, these apartments can not be privatized by outsiders. There are several con-
sequences of legal arrangements in this area.
{ Privatization of apartments actually changes nothing in the ownership and
management of the whole building. Even if 100% of the apartments are priva-
tized, the building can still be considered as a municipal one.
{ The only currently available legal form for privatization of the existing multi-
apartment buildings in Russia is the formation of condominium associations.
However, condominiums, rst, are very dicult to form on the basis of already
occupied houses (Ryazan is the leading Russian city in condo formation with
less than 30 condominiums formed by early 1996) and, second, are not the
most stable and ecient form of private ownership for housing in existing
Russian conditions: dierent level of incomes and demands of condo members,
undeveloped housing market, lack of professional management, etc., will aect
the condos' ability to enforce their ownership rights.
{ A lot of households are not interested in even free housing privatization because
their rights are well protected against eviction without getting a formal title
for the apartments.
(ii) Subsidization. Housing in Russia is a heavily subsidized sector. On average, resi-
dents covered by the end of 1995 between 20 and 30% of actual housing and utility
costs, all the rest was covered by subsidies either from local budgets (for municipal
housing) or from enterprises (for enterprise housing). Utility taris for residents are
the same in municipal and enterprise buildings. The pace of elimination of sub-
sidies is limited by both the general level of population incomes and by political
constraints. For these reasons, many Eastern European countries, including Russia,
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Ukraine, and Lithuania, found it hard to eliminate housing subsidies simultane-
ously with overall price liberalization. As a result of this, these subsidies are still
the largest subsidies remaining in the scal systems and these countries have chosen
a very cautious approach to their step-by-step elimination. Preservation of subsidies
limits the possibility and desirability of real housing privatization:
{ Even if apartments and buildings from the enterprise housing stock are pri-
vatized, the responsibility for housing and similar subsidies is to be divested
to municipal governments. In Russia and some other FSU states, when ten-
ants privatize their apartments, it does not lead to any change in household
housing monthly payments. According to the existing regulations, any form
of discrimination in maintenance/utility taris based on the ownership rights
of the tenants is not allowed: all of them have to pay the same bills.
9
It is
true for both privatized apartments and privatized buildings in the form of
condominiums.
{ Remaining subsidization unavoidably will shift incentives of actual and po-
tential building owners. They would not feel too much responsibility for the
cost-eective management and maintenance of their property, but they would
have strong incentives to ght for extracting the full amount of budget subsi-
dies. The situation is aggravated by the fact that tenants are billed according
to special norms of consumption but not to the actual consumption and as
such they do not have incentives for more eective use of heat, water and gas.
In these circumstances, while municipalities retaining major nancial responsi-
bility for housing, can be more interested in the rationalization of the housing
sector than private owners.
(iii) Technical reasons. Provision of utility services has been organized in Russia in
a way which is not very suitable for transition to private ownership of buildings.
Specically, in most places, housing is supplied by heat not from small boilers serving
one or few buildings. On the contrary, in both municipal and enterprise housing
heat supply is organized through centralized heating systems, which means the
existence of one or several big heat suppliers and long networks connecting them
with nal users. Heat supply is interrelated across buildings and tenants technically
do not have the possibility to regulate heat delivery in a decentralized way. In some
buildings, there are not even heat exchangers and water circulating within building
heating systems is not separated from external pipes. As a result, tenants have
almost no way of inuencing the delivery of heat or the quality of incoming water,
which can badly inuence pipes within their buildings. Changes, which have to be
9
And sometimes even lower. For example, to push apartment privatization, authorities of the city of
Novocherkassk made a decision to decrease by 3% all the rent and utility payments for the owners of
privatized ats.
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introduced in this system to protect the rights of apartment owners, require certain
investments and can not happen overnight.
(iv) Monopolization of maintenance. Provision of maintenance services also has been
organized in a way, which served the needs of the centralized, state-owned and
state-managed system. Though certain eorts to undertake reforms have been made
recently in most localities, the level of articial monopolization in this area is still
quite high. Typically, the market of municipal housing stock maintenance is of-
cially shared by several municipal maintenance companies and each building is
assigned to one particular service provider. Enterprises usually have maintenance
units in their structure, which provide corresponding services to the enterprise hous-
ing stock. Although it is less dicult to overcome monopolization in the provision
of maintenance services than in utility services, for some time, the absence of re-
liable alternative sources of these services also can be considered as a barrier for
immediate ecient housing privatization.
4.3 Why divestiture, not \let the market decide?"
There is one more popular argument, however, that there is no need for government
in transitional economies to interfere in the area of social benets (including housing)
provided by former state enterprises, as the market itself would sort it out anyway. The
common reasons for this conclusion are: (1) rms in the established market economies also
provide a number of non-cash benets as a part of their overall compensation package;
(2) social benets are one of the ways for the rms to compete in the labor market and
thus enforced divestiture might aect the mechanisms of market competition; (3) rms
in transition have proved their ability to respond to changing economic signals and there
is no reason to believe that they would deal with the problem of social benets on their
own less eciently than with the other adjustment problems (Schaer, 1995).
While for a number of non-core benets this type of logic seems to be quite correct,
provision of core benets, rst of all housing, by SOEs and former SOEs makes the
situation in transitional economies and corresponding rms very much dierent from
that in the countries with developed markets. The key dierence is that those benets,
which are both a real burden for the rms and a headache for governments in transition,
are not a part of the rms' compensation packages.
10
Enterprises have to provide these
services not only to their employees, but also to a substantial number of other residents in
surrounding localities. Moreover, they have to provide these services at heavily subsidized
prices, i.e., they are involved, in fact, in direct delivering public services instead of the
local governments. Due to political constraints, there is no hope that these subsidies
will be terminated in the short run. \To let the market decide" in such an environment
is the equivalent to giving permission to rms for unilateral either withdrawal from or
10
In addition, the level of social expenditures per capita to compare to cash wages in Russia is 3{4
times higher than that in major Western European countries | as reported by Schaer (1995).
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substantial reduction in delivery of some basic public services. This option is considered as
politically and socially unacceptable by most governments in transitional economies. The
whole problem of divestiture has derived from the necessity to design a procedure that
would substitute enterprises by municipalities in a way, which preserves the continuation
of basic services and takes into account major scal and institutional consequences of such
substitution.
There are some other important considerations, which require involvement of the gov-
ernment in solving the problem of enterprise social benets and, in particular, in acceler-
ating divestiture.
(i) There is a serious dierence in the provision of social benets in money and in kind,
especially when provision in kind includes holding social assets. Cash benets are
very exible and can be adjusted in accordance with the nancial situation in the
rms. And if they are reduced, it does not eect the overall abilities to provide social
services in this locality. However it is not true for social assets. It is impossible to
get rid of social assets in the short run if the nancial situation of the enterprise is
becoming worse. The way how enterprises deal with the problem in such situations is
just to terminate the operation and maintenance of these social assets. As in many
localities enterprises are the main providers of social services or at least play an
important role in it, it can badly aect the general situation with the social sphere.
It is especially true for housing where residents do not have an alternative at all and
enterprises' reduction in maintenance funding leads to the general deterioration of
living conditions. The other part of the coin is that badly performing enterprises
with big social assets substantially increase their lobbying power and can force the
government to provide nancial assistance to them and prevent their bankruptcy
just because of dangerous social consequences of their failure. Taking into account
all the bad social and political consequences of such situations as well as nancial
instability of all the production sector in Russia, it is much more preferable to
undertake divestiture not in the situation of emergency, but in normal conditions,
preparing all the necessary nancial arrangements, documentation and logistical
preconditions.
(ii) Such social assets as the accumulated housing stock can not be used as a tool of
competition in the labor market. As was mentioned above, enterprises have no right
either to evict those employees who left the enterprises or to increase rent payments
for them. They also have to follow the local policy in cost recovery increase. Any
substantial revision of such arrangements is hardly politically acceptable: this will
be considered as discrimination of housing rights of tenants in the enterprise housing,
which still forms at least 30% of the urban housing stock. Newly constructed housing
can be included into the charter capital of enterprises and can be used in a more
exible way to support the labor policy of enterprises.
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(iii) In some specic sectors the right of enterprises to hold social assets in practice results
in substantial negative externalities. For example, railroads in Russia hold, fund and
operate a huge social infrastructure, which badly aects the level of railway taris.
In its turn, the level of taris in the sector now is one of the main obstacles for growth
in domestic inter-regional trade and improvement of enterprises' competitiveness.
Thus, the problem of social assets, which simultaneously are (i) not included into the
charter capital of enterprises, (ii) can not be immediately privatized and (iii) are heavily
subsidized, is the most painful one. Only two types of solutions, from our point of view,
are possible in this situation. Either enterprises continue to hold these social assets on
their balance (with no right to make any strategic decisions about these assets and full or
partial nancial and managerial responsibility for their operation and maintenance) and
enjoy some nancial benets established by transparent and fare rules or municipalities
accept these assets, which means full responsibility for their further fate, and nance
them from their general tax revenues. We are going to argue that from the long-term
perspective the last option is better both for enterprises and the economy as a whole.
5 Consequences of Divestiture for Enterprises
We have more information from the survey to analyze the process and consequences of
enterprise housing divestiture. In this section we are going to use the example of this very
important part of enterprise social assets to draw some additional conclusions. Most of
the enterprises in the sample are interested in divestiture of their housing, but most of
them are still in the process of divestiture and have not completed it, so we can use only
their estimates on potential consequences of this process. However, enterprise managers
seem to take this process very seriously and almost all of them (20{21 from 24) were able
to give their estimates regarding the possible eect housing divestiture might have on
dierent aspects of enterprise performance (Table 5).
5.1 Financial impact
As a result of dierent tax treatment analyzed above and the dierent nancial situation
of the enterprises, nancial consequences of divestiture vary on a case by case basis. Three
enterprises reported that divestiture would make no impact on their nancial situation,
two even thought that nancial pressure would be harder. But most enterprises admitted
that the nancial result of housing divestiture would be positive. According to the general
estimates, the enterprise sector as a whole is expected to gain only about 0.5% of GDP
from the divestiture process in the short term. However, individual enterprises that
provide a lot of housing will get substantial net benets | up to 70% of their current
gross expenditures on housing (see Annex 4).
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5.2 Administrative impact
Managers are more uniform in their answers about the managerial consequences of divesti-
ture. Most of them agreed that managerial burden would decrease. It is quite natural,
taking into account that, according to the survey, more than 7% of the enterprises' labor
force was involved in maintaining and operation of enterprise housing either full time or
more than half of their working time. Full employment in both housing and other so-
cial activities amounted to almost 18% of total labor. According to the Urban Institute
(1995), about 20% of senior management time is typically spent on enterprise housing
related activities.
5.3 Impact on the attraction of employees
Managers do not think that housing divestiture would necessarily limit their opportunities
to hire workers. More than half of the managers think that it would not inuence this
process at all. It is not a big surprise, taking into account that in many cases most of
the residents of enterprise housing are not enterprise employees
11
and enterprises have
no right to evict the residents or to increase the rent payment if the residents leave the
enterprise. Increasing competition on the labor market as well as labor shedding by many
enterprises should also be considered as important factors that dramatically changed the
labor market situation. In two cases managers consider divestiture as a way to increase
opportunities to hire workers, possibly because it improves nancial performance of the
enterprise. However, the situation seems to vary in dierent cases, as 7 managers admit
that divestiture would limit their abilities to hire workers and in one case it was the reason
for the enterprise not to initiate divestiture at all.
Workers themselves are also not very interested in holding enterprise housing (Table 6).
Only three enterprises reported that their working collectives objected to the divestiture
process. Yet only in one of these cases it was the trade union who protested, and in
the other two resistance came from housing maintenance units of the enterprises. It
is also quite natural, as enterprises in many cases have reduced their expenditures on
housing below minimally necessary levels and almost stop maintaining it, which leads to
deterioration of the housing stock and decreasing comfort for residents. So, even those
employees, who live in the enterprise housing, do not consider divestiture of the buildings
to municipalities as a threat to their benet package: they are quite sure that after
divestiture rent payments will remain intact and housing services will not deteriorate
further.
11
According to the survey, employees or retired employees are living in 56% of the apartments of
enterprise housing in surveyed cities (of which the share of pensioners amounted to 14%).
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5.4 Impact on prices
About a half of respondents do not see any connection between enterprise housing di-
vestiture and the level of prices for their products. However, the other half considers
divestiture as a possible source to decrease prices. It supports the idea that in many cases
housing divestiture might have a direct positive inuence on enterprise competitiveness.
It is also interesting that enterprise managers started to understand the inter-relation
between the level of social spending and their market competitiveness.
5.5 Impact on wages
This question was not asked directly in the survey but the data provided by enterprises
and answers to some other questions help to reveal the situation in this area. It was
expected that enterprise savings deriving from the reduction in their social spending will
facilitate cash wage adjustment, which, in turn, will support the reduction of budget
subsidies for the social sector and public sector reforms in general. However, as it follows
from the survey, in practice, enterprise managers have not conducted such a type of wage
adjustment to compensate employees for the reduction in real social spending. Only 1
out of 17 rms, which had reduced delivery of social services recently, did this with some
compensation to employees through cash wage increases. The same ndings have been
revealed by the Urban Institute (1995), which reports that managers prefer to spend
corresponding savings on purposes, other than wage increases, considered as being more
important for enterprise survival.
It seems that the absence of the link between reduction in enterprise social expenditure
and an increase in cash wages might be explained by the fact that the dynamics of the real
cash wage has been determined so far by other types of the factors, rst of all, by average
levels of wages prevailing in corresponding localities, which, in turn, mainly follows the
price level of basic consumer goods. The changes in costs of living but not reductions in
non-cash benets inuence the enterprise wage policy (Commander, Dhar and Yemtsov,
1995). Such implicit indexation of wages was rather eective in Russia in 1992{94 and
it caused quite a high level of real wage stability during the period of price liberalization
and high and volatile ination. This might suggest that, while currently managers do
not use their savings from social spending cuts for wage adjustment, they might conduct
a dierent type of wage policy in dierent circumstances, if cost recovery in housing is
increased substantially and housing expenditures become a real factor determining the
costs of living. Then, it is likely that the growth in employees' housing expenditures, as it
happened in 1992{94 with their expenditures on food, would be an eective determinant
of managers' policy with respect to cash wage adjustments.
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6 Consequences of Divestiture for Municipalities
and the Economy as a Whole
6.1 Divestiture and policy reforms
Various components of the Russian public sector require radical changes in their opera-
tional and managerial principals. Some currently publicly funded services should be taken
out from the public sector completely (housing), others should expect either an increase
in cost recovery (child care) or the emergence of more exible co-existence of public and
private providers (health care, education). It might be dicult to achieve these changes
without prior transferring social assets under full public control, i.e., without divestiture.
First experience with housing reforms in Russia demonstrated practical advantages of
having enterprise housing divested to municipalities, which currently have more man-
agerial capacity and more incentives to push for housing privatization, increase in cost
recovery, establishing housing allowances for poor households, etc. It might sound contro-
versial but re-establishing full public control over some sectors such as housing might be
viewed as an important facilitator for the success of subsequent privatization. Even when
enterprises have to support a large housing stock, housing remains a by-side activity for
them. Enterprises do not see themselves as promoters of any housing reforms, and their
preferable policy in this eld is to be a passive and not necessarily accurate follower of
recommendations coming from local governments, while their major adjustment has been
taking place through simple cutting of funding for housing maintenance. As a result,
enterprise housing in Russia is on average in a worse physical shape, it has a slower rate
of unit privatization, and its tenants have less access to housing allowances.
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6.2 Gross potential scal impact of divestiture
Analysis of the structure of enterprise social spending demonstrates that the total incre-
mental scal burden from full-scale divestiture will be much smaller than the current level
of enterprise spending on social services. One might argue that the potential scal impact
is not more than 60% of the amount reported by the enterprises, i.e., it is close to 2% of
GDP. This is due to the fact, as was partially discussed above, that various types of social
spending currently nanced by enterprises are not transferable (i.e., they are not subject
to divestiture) either in the nancial or in the physical sense. These non-transferable
types of services include:
(i) Those services nanced not from enterprises' revenues but from budget transfers.
The corresponding assets might be transferred but it will not impose extra costs
12
From 9 cities which provided information on this issue in 5 cases privatization within municipal
housing stock was higher than within the enterprise one, in 2 cases it was equal and in 2 cases privatization
was higher in enterprise housing stock.
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upon the budget if it will be accompanied by redistributing the transfers from en-
terprises to municipalities.
(ii) Those services constituting an important part of the overall compensation package of
employees as non-wage benets. Under existing economic environment, it is unlikely
that managers of state-owned and formerly state-owned enterprises will insist either
on divestiture of these services or their substantial reduction because they are not
considered as a real burden by enterprise management. One might expect that real
cuts will happen on its own only in the medium term as a result of substantial
changes in both corporate governance regime and taxation.
(iii) Those social assets remaining in the enterprises' possession as a result of their pri-
vatization by enterprises.
(iv) Those social assets, which should not remain in public possession in the market
economy and must be privatized in the case of divestiture.
Moreover, in some cases municipal costs of supporting divested assets might be lower
than those of enterprises. This is due to the fact that a part of social assets, which are in
the ownership of enterprises, is under-utilized and overstaed.
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6.3 Potential scal impact of divestiture for local and federal
budgets
Since late 1993, cities gained access to two new instruments to help nance social assets.
One is the local tax for support of social assets, a 1.5% tax levied on all enterprise sales,
and the second source is federal transfers for social asset divestiture. This means that
additional nancial burden is shared between local and federal budgets. Three dierent
situations of such cost-sharing should be considered:
(i) Although the eective tax rate for the turnover tax is much lower than the statutory
1.5% (close to 1% according to our estimates), the total revenues from this tax are
still quite substantial. For six cities involved in EHDP, the tax provided on average
about 10% of the total budget revenues including transfers from federal and regional
budgets. This new source could potentially be used to fund an additional amount
of housing divested from enterprises. In this case the average net costs to local
governments of the overall divestiture process would be in the order of only 3{4%
of current total regional budget expenditures (0.6% of GDP). This gap had to be
13
For instance, in Kyrgyz Republic, teachers' salaries in kindergartens managed by enterprises are 10{
50% higher than those in municipal kindergartens. If the whole kindergarten system were rationalized to
bring enterprise kindergartens to an equivalent current municipal expenditure level with respect to food,
salaries, and utility spending, the corresponding savings would amount to 20% of the current total costs
of supporting kindergartens (ADB & Associates Ltd., 1995).
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covered by federal transfers. However, the eect on individual cities (especially one-
enterprise towns) could be quite dierent, and in some cases a new nancial burden
might appear to be just unaordable for certain cities.
(ii) Since the moment when the turnover tax had been introduced in late 1993, munic-
ipalities collected quite a lot of revenues from this source but the actual divestiture
was very slow. Additional revenues were actually used to fund maintenance and
operation of the existing municipal housing. As a result, local authorities put them-
selves in a much more dicult nancial situation regarding further divestiture than
it could be if the recent introduction of the turnover tax would have been accompa-
nied by the same rate of actual transferring of enterprise assets. According to our
estimate, if the cities increase the eective tax rate of the turnover tax up to 1.5%
and get rid of the remaining prot tax exemptions, they will be able to get about
0.7{0.8% of GDP as additional budget revenues. However, the full scale divestiture
completion will require about 2% of GDP in incremental expenditures. It is quite
likely that municipalities will try to fund the remaining scal gap of about 1.2% of
GDP or 6{7% of the overall regional budget spending by requiring support through
the federal budget transfers.
(iii) Some local ocials argue that not only recurrent costs but also a certain amount
of capital repair of transferred assets should be funded. Enterprises did not nance
their housing stock as needed, so local ocials assume that some additional in-
vestments in rehabilitation will be necessary just after divestiture to compensate
consequences of recent poor maintenance. When such adjustment for capital repair
is done (0.4% of GDP), the total annual scal gap for cities as a result of divesti-
ture might be estimated as 10% of the existing regional budgets. Correspondingly,
this amount, being an equivalent to 1.2% of GDP, should be considered as the up-
per limit for the amount of the federal transfers allocated across municipalities to
support divestiture.
Federal transfers of this magnitude are justiable only if all the remaining housing
and other assets have been accepted by municipalities. However, recent developments in
this eld demonstrate that requests for the federal assistance led by cities are growing
much faster than the real rate of divestiture, and the federal government does not have
institutional capacity for properly evaluating real municipal needs in such transfers. In
particular, the cities' request for federal transfers in 1994 amounted to 20.7 trillion rubles
or 3.3% of GDP (Urban Institute, 1995), while not more than a quarter of the overall
enterprise housing stock was divested in 1992{94. After consideration of these municipal
requests, the Russian Ministry of Finance allocated 12.1 trillion rubles (2.0% of GDP)
for this purpose in the 1994 budget, but later it disbursed only 4.5 trillion rubles during
the year or 37% of the ear-marked amount in the budget. But given the slow rate of
divestiture, one can argue that this was a sucient amount. To push divestiture, the
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federal government had to develop a much smaller but much better targeted program
of federal assistance, which would account for real variation across municipalities in tax
base, divestiture rate, and the stock of enterprise housing.
7 Pace and Barriers for Divestiture
7.1 Real rate of housing divestiture in Russia
Housing statistics is in ux in Russia now, and so it is not very clear how much housing was
actually divested to municipalities. The report by the Urban Institute (1995) estimates
that only 20{25% of the initial enterprise housing stock was divested in 1991{94. The
evidence from various surveys demonstrated that the actual estimate might be closer to
the lower end of this interval. Our survey in December of 1994 showed that the share
of enterprise housing in the surveyed cities was still above 40%.
14
The large enterprise
survey held in summer of 1994 revealed that by that time less than 5% of enterprises
actually transferred any of their social assets (Commander and Lee, 1995). Only one
from 24 enterprises participating in our small survey in December 1994 had completed
divestiture of a portion of its housing stock by that time, while the rest either still had
been running negotiations with local authorities or even had not started them yet. All
these gures prove that, in 1995, at least 35% of the total urban housing stock was still
nanced by enterprises.
15
In addition, divestiture in rural areas was even slower (see
Annex 3). However, we would like to mention that a part of this housing, which is
described as being nanced by enterprises, in fact is controlled and nanced by various
federal ministries (e.g., Defence, Interior), and this housing is not subject to divestiture.
7.2 Barriers for divestiture
While enterprises are in general interested in the process of housing divestiture, local
authorities, as we discussed above, are in general reluctant to accept enterprise housing.
The situation with enterprises in the process of divestiture negotiations is described in
Table 7. Two main tools are used by local administrations to impede divestiture.
(i) All the housing is declared to be divested (which actually means nothing, as even
formally housing is only on the balance, not in the property of enterprises), but
enterprises are forced to keep responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the
same housing stock. As one can see from Table 7, it was envisaged in the divestiture
agreements that enterprises are going to continue maintenance and capital repair
at their own expense in two cases from 11 and continue utility services provision at
their own expense in three cases from 11. However, as the denition of divestiture
14
The enterprise housing share in the total urban housing stock initially amounted to about 45% in
1990.
15
This also includes some housing nanced by federal ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence.
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is very unclear and a lot of compromise solutions (as cost sharing agreements, for
example) are legally possible, local authorities use these instruments to delay the
actual divestiture.
(ii) As preliminary conditions for actual divestiture, local authorities insist on a huge
amount of capital repair both of the housing stock and utility networks to be -
nanced and actually fullled by enterprises. Of course, it is impossible to determine
in general what amount of repair works can be considered as reasonable and what is
not, but this requirement can be easily used by local authorities to delay divestiture
if they would like to. Such conditions, being very frequently included in divestiture
agreements, lead to a number of conicts. If the enterprise has no money and no
ability to carry out repair work, the municipality sometimes demands to acquire
some additional property to compensate these costs. As the mayor of one of the
cities admitted, \if it (the enterprise) has no money, we can take cars, tractors,
administrative buildings". Complaints for the same treatment were expressed by
the respondents in the survey. The other conicting issue is divestiture of enterprise
housing maintenance units. Most of the enterprises have no problem with transfer-
ring employees from this unit to the municipality (divested maintenance units are
usually included into existing municipal maintenance structures or reorganized into
separate municipal enterprises), though employees themselves sometimes have dif-
ferent attitude, as was mentioned above. The conict is around the amount of assets
(workshops, tools), which should be divested to municipalities along with housing.
All these conicts are quite sucient to delay actual divestiture substantially.
8 Necessary Measures to Accelerate Divestiture
Divestiture is a very complicated and painful process which involves a lot of nancial, lo-
gistical and administrative issues and simple solutions are not appropriate here. However,
there are certain aspects of the problem, the solution of which can simplify control over
the process and can create additional incentives to push divestiture further:
(i) Denition of divestiture should be legally claried. Local authorities might have a
right to conclude co-nancing agreements with enterprises and leave certain func-
tions for maintenance and operation of social assets with them but such arrange-
ments should not be considered as divestiture. Divestiture means transferring not
only the title but also nancial and managerial responsibilities to municipalities.
Only in these cases should cities be eligible for federal transfers and other forms of
support allocated for this purpose.
(ii) Institutional framework to solve conicts between local authorities and enterprises in
the process of preparing and implementing divestiture must be established. These
problems, probably, should be solved on the regional level with involvement, if
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necessary, of federal authorities but the existence of disagreements should not be
used to delay divestiture forever.
(iii) Methods of estimating divestiture nancial consequences should be improved both
to make the picture more transparent for local authorities, who often do not know
how much extra funds they will receive as a result of the elimination of local turnover
and prot tax benets. This also will help to improve accuracy of regional requests
for the federal transfers led with the Ministry of Finance.
Enterprise social assets divestiture imposes additional nancial and managerial pres-
sure on local authorities. According to the survey of municipalities, which examined this
problem with regard to housing divestiture, even the existing level of budget subsidies for
the housing sector is considered as serious or even unaordable burden for the budget.
According to city ocials, if the housing divestiture would be completed, the share of
the budget to be spent on housing subsidies would increase signicantly, typically double
or triple. As was mentioned above, on average such estimates are substantially upwards
biased. This is, in particular, due to the under-estimation of additional tax revenues asso-
ciated with divestiture. Besides, more active policy reforms can potentially ease excessive
budget pressures derived from existing housing subsidies. Two types of activities should
be given top priority:
(i) Increase in cost recovery. By the time of the survey, cost recovery in the housing
sector of surveyed cities was between 4 and 16% (despite the fact that the cities had
the legal right to have cost recovery of 20%). By early 1996, with the legal right to
have 60% cost recovery, its general level amounted to between 20 and 30%, while
some cities achieved 40% by the end of 1995. While increase in cost recovery will
require more spending on housing allowances to protect vulnerable households, on
the whole, growth in housing taris would eventually transfer a part of the nancial
burden from municipalities to residents. However, the population income level puts
objective limits to the pace of this process.
(ii) Policy and institutional reforms. Current institutional arrangements in the Russian
social sector are far from optimal and lead to huge eciency losses. Additional
losses also arise from poor technologies used in this sector. The nancial analysis
shows that it would be quite dicult to insure a substantial increase in cost recovery,
and therefore, reduction in housing subsidies, without a wide range of policy and
institutional reforms implementation as well as investments in the existing housing
stock to increase its eciency (Freinkman, Tolstopyatenko, 1996). It means that
divestiture would be unaordable and, as a result, unsustainable in the long run
without accelerating wide-scale housing and other public sector reforms. In many
locations these problems are quite well understood by authorities. Two types of
activities are considered at the local level as a possible way to deal with them.
First, local authorities try to decrease losses by encouraging saving of resources,
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rst of all energy, which includes the introduction of new energy- and water-saving
technologies. Second, savings can be received as a result of policy and institutional
reforms, specically :
{ demonopolization of maintenance market, attracting private capital and the
privatization of municipal units in this area;
{ better regulation of utilities as natural monopolies;
{ ownership changes in the housing sector: creation of condominiums (as more
radical changes are prevented by the concept of voluntary and potentially end-
less apartment privatization);
{ management changes: introduction of private management.
9 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of available policy options with regard to the restructuring
of enterprise social assets. It argues that these options are dierent depending on the type
of provided social benets: while some assets and corresponding services are expected to
remain intact and continue to be a part of a traditional labor compensation package, other
assets have to be either privatized or mandatory transferred to municipal governments.
Enterprise housing and, to a less extent, child care facilities should be, rst of all, a subject
of such divestiture that will have a positive inuence on both enterprise restructuring and
public sector reform in Russia.
The paper also summarizes the current practice of housing divestiture as it has been
conducted by Russian municipal governments. The existing \rules of the game" are quite
non-transparent, and the whole process is basically determined by interests and relative
inuence of the players involved, while the federal regulations are widely violated and
only partly enforced. As a result, all the major determinants of the speed of divestiture
appeared to be under the control of local authorities: they have inuenced to a great
extent both the legal and nancial framework for this process, and have a number of
opportunities for postponing or completely blocking divestiture.
On the contrary, most of the enterprise managers are interested in housing divesti-
ture. They expect nancial gains from this process (though cost reduction will be partly
compensated by an increase in tax payments) as well as a radical decrease of the admin-
istrative burden. Half of them admitted that housing divestiture would allow them to
decrease prices for their products and respectively increase their competitiveness.
The paper provides quantitative estimates of the scal price of divestiture: the gov-
ernment will be required to spend up to 1.2{1.6% of GDP annually to support divested
assets. To arrive at these estimates, we provide quantitative estimates of the overall social
spending of Russian enterprises in 1992{94, as 3{4% of GDP per year, and evaluate the
potential share of these costs, which will have to be covered by the consolidated budget
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after divestiture. It appears that the total enterprise social spending in Russia remains
at its very high pre-reform level of 20% as a share of the gross wage costs. This makes
the Russian enterprise sector quite dierent from the path of enterprise restructuring in
Eastern Europe.
While the overall scal price for divestiture is not too high, an ecient government
support of divestiture will require a proper evaluation of across country dierences with
regard to tax base and the share of enterprise assets. So far, the Ministry of Finance does
not have enough capacity to exercise such a precise assessment. To make the process of
divestiture less damaging, the Government has to clarify the corresponding regulations,
encourage local administrations to increase cost recovery in housing, and to develop other
various reforms in the housing sector that will bring about a reduction in its excessive
maintenance costs. If macro stabilization in Russia proceeds further, the government has
to be prepared to face a much faster reduction in enterprises' spending on maintaining
their social assets.
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ANNEX 1: Characteristic of the Sample in the Enterprise Survey
A special survey of 24 Russian manufacturing enterprises from ten dierent cities was
conducted in December 1994 by VTSIOM as part of the preparation for the World Bank's
Enterprise Housing Divestiture Project.
Location:
single enterprise or single sector cities:
Novodvinsk | 1
Dzerzhinsk | 2
cities dominated by several large enterprises:
Engels | 2
Novocherkassk | 3
Orenburg | 2
Komsomolsk-na-Amure | 3
medium-sized cities with diversied economy:
Smolensk | 3
Kursk | 3
large cities with diversied economy:
Volgograd | 2
Krasnoyarsk | 3.
Legal form:
joint stock company with controlling interest retained by the state | 3
joint stock company with less than 50% of the shares retained by the state | 9
totally private joint stock company | 11
state enterprise | 1
Relation to privatization process:
in the process of privatization | 5
privatization process completed | 18
privatization is forbidden | 1
Stage of enterprise housing divestiture:
divestiture completed before 1990 | 1
in the process of divestiture | 11
are interested in divestiture, but relevant negotiations have not started yet | 10
are not interested in divestiture | 2
Financial and economic characteristics. While the enterprises in the sample varied sub-
stantially with regard to their sizes as well as to the magnitude of their housing burden,
most were the large and extra-large rms (average employment for the sample was above
4,300 in 1994), and from one to three of the largest corporatized rms were selected in
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each city. Most rms experienced substantial nancial problems: During 1992{93 their
average reduction in employment amounted to 25% of the labor force.
16
In addition, in
the middle of 1994, about 13% of their labor was permanently on unpaid leave. As a
result of these problems, 17 from 24 rms said they had reduced delivery of social services
recently, while only 7 rms did not decrease the volume of provided social services.
Social and housing spending. At the same time, the rms were not able to reduce their
spending on housing. Real spending on housing in 1994 remained at its 1993 level, while
both cash wages and non-housing social spending declined in real terms, and tenants have
paid a twice higher share of the total housing costs in 1994 than in 1993. On average, each
enterprise in the sample was responsible for maintaining more than 80 multi-apartment
buildings with as many as 5,000 apartments in them.
Total housing costs denominated in per employee terms amounted to 20% of the
average cash wages,
17
while the full housing and social costs made 35% of the average
wage.
18
This provides a useful indicator of the scale of wage distortions which will be
eliminated as a result of divestiture. Since the total payroll costs for Russian industry
are almost equal to the value of the gross prot, this data might be also considered as
a measure of potential gross nancial benets for enterprises participating in divestiture,
without accounting for an osetting tax eect.
It is interesting to note that 20 out of 24 enterprises have an accumulated stock of non-
nished housing and they expressed the wish to complete construction of these sites if they
could get sucient funds. Enterprises reported that more than half of their remaining
employees were registered for getting a new apartment.
16
All averages presented in this section are non-weighted.
17
Expenditures on heat and hot water constituted about a half of the total housing costs.
18
Comparison of these results with the data from Table 2 proves that the social burden is rather
unevenly distributed across enterprises. While for the industrial sector as a whole, average social costs
amount to a quarter of both payroll and gross prot, for the largest providers this level is about 35%,
which means that for many small and medium-sized enterprises this amounts to only 10{15%.
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Annex 2: Major Regulations Governing Enterprise Housing Divestiture
RF Law On Fundamentals of the Tax System, December 27, 1991 (amended by Law On
Introducing Changes and Amendments to Certain Russian Federation Tax Laws,
December 22, 1992).
RF Law On General Principles of Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation,
August 28, 1995.
RF Presidential Decree No. 721 On Organization Measures of Transformation of State-
Owned Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies, July 1, 1992.
RF Presidential Decree No. 8 On Use of Socio-Cultural and Communal-and-Personal
Service Facilities of Privatized Enterprises, January 10, 1993.
RF Presidential Decree No. 2265 On Guarantees of Local Self-Governance in the Russian
Federation, December 22, 1993.
RF Presidential Instruction No. 114-RP On Approval of the Status of By-Site Compo-
sition of Federal, State and Municipal Ownership and on Procedure of Ownership
Rights Registration, March, 18, 1992.
RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3020-1 On Delimitation of State Property in the Russian
Federation, December 29, 1991, (with editorial changes of May 23, 1992 and July
21, 1993).
RF Government Decree No. 86 On Procedure of Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes Reorganiza-
tion, December 29, 1991.
RF Government Decree No. 708 On Privatization and Reorganization Procedure of En-
terprises in the Agro-Industrial Complex, September 4, 1992.
RF Government Decree No. 1325 On Financing of Socio-Cultural and Communal-and-
Personal Services Being Transferred into the Authority of Local Bodies of Executive
Power during Privatization of Enterprises, December 23, 1993.
RF Government Decree No. 235 On the Order of Transferring of Socio-Cultural and
Communal-and-Personal Services in the Federal Property into State Property of
Subjects of Russian Federation and Municipal Property, March 7, 1995.
RF State Committee for Management of State Property (GKI) Order No. 135-r On
Streamlining of the Process of Dierentiation of Ownership Rights to Socio-Cultural
and Communal-and-Everyday Services of Privatized Enterprises, January 27, 1993.
RF State Committee for Management of State Property (GKI) Letter No. 13/648 On
Procedure of Transferring Enterprise Housing Stock, Housing Maintenance and
Housing Repair Units Servicing This Stock into Municipal Ownership, January 24,
1995.
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Annex 3: Social Assets in the Coal Industry and Agriculture
Coal Industry
The coal sector is the largest single subsidy item remaining in the federal budget. The
sector received about 1.2% of GDP in subsidies in 1994 and, as estimated, about 0.6% of
GDP in 1995.
19
Due to its privileged status under socialism, coal mines have accumulated
a plenty of social assets, which are currently a subject to the direct government nancing
together with covering operational losses of coal extraction. By our estimates, at least
125,000 employees, or 15% of the total, of the state coal company Rosugol, are engaged in
providing social services. Budget subsidies to support social assets amount to 17% of the
total budget funding, i.e., 0.19% of GDP in 1994. These social spending per employee of
Rosugol makes 28% of their average wage bill. The Russian Government has developed a
number of recommendations to re-channel the social subsidies from the mine associations
to municipal governments in coal regions. (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995) but there is not
much progress with their implementation so far.
Agriculture
Agriculture is another sector of the Russian economy, in which rms are heavily involved
in providing social services to both employees and local population while the government is
nancing the delivery of these services through implicit and explicit subsidies. According
to Goskomstat, agricultural farms spent 0.25% of GDP on social services in 1993{94,
which is about 8% of the entire enterprise social spending. At the same time, explicit
government transfers to agriculture, not including tax exemptions, comprising 2.4% of
GDP in 1994,
20
are about 10 times higher than direct social spending by farms. In fact,
social services in agriculture are heavily subsidized by the government in an indirect way
via subsidies to main farm products. This distorts the incentives of all the parties involved
and make the nancial environment within the sector non-transparent.
While potential scal impact of divestiture in rural areas is quite small,
21
there are a
number of institutional and legal peculiarities of the status of social assets managed by
agricultural farms versus those controlled by urban industrial enterprises, which compli-
cate divestiture of these assets to local governments (see below). As a result, divestiture
in rural areas is going even slower than in cities. It leads to problems of two dierent
kinds. First, under the current nancial crisis in agriculture, the quality of traditionally
provided services has substantially deteriorated. And, in contrast to cities, much of the
rural population does not have access to alternative sources of supply of these services,
especially in education and health. Second, delivering such important services via farms
19
As reported by the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation.
20
Figures are estimates on the basis of Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation and Central
Bank of Russia data. This includes 1% of directed subsidized credits from both CBR and the consolidated
budget and 1.4% of GDP of explicit budget (both federal and local) subsidies. Less than 10% of these
subsidies are explicitly targeted at supporting the delivery of social services.
21
Rural social assets are relatively cheaper because housing makes a smaller share of these assets. In
addition, rural housing has much lower access to utilities, and, therefore requires less subsidies.
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creates additional barriers for farm restructuring because of the disincentives for workers
to leave the farms and because closing loss-making farms is dicult when there is no
alternative institutional framework for delivering social services.
Institutional features include:
(i) A tax regime under which farms are totally exempt from paying some basic taxes
such as prot tax and turnover tax and local authorities have no power to reduce
these exemptions as social assets are divested. The local governments therefore lack
a solid tax base to nance divested social services, and, in comparison with cities,
rural local authorities have even less incentives to accept the asset transfer.
(ii) The institutional weakness of local authorities in rural areas at the village level.
Traditionally in Russia, local administrations in such places perform only very simple
administrative functions, such as registration, and are not capable of managing the
delivery of social and housing services. Construction, capital repair, heat and other
utility supplies, etc., have been delegated to specialized divisions of large agricultural
farms, and were not incorporated into the municipal government structure. Human
capital is also inadequate for regulating utility enterprises in the case of the transfer
of existing facilities into independent utility rms for servicing local social assets.
(iii) Less scope for competition within the housing sector in rural areas, at least in the
medium term. It is likely that large former state farms will still dominate at the local
level and will retain control over maintenance services. The combination of non-
competitive supply of services and weak governance capability of local authorities
complicates asset, especially housing divestiture.
Legal features include:
(i) Employees' rights. According to regulations, social assets managed by state or
former state enterprises are subject to divestiture. However, about half of all agri-
cultural farms in Russia before 1992 had a legal status of kolkhozes, i.e., they were
collectively but not state owned. This means that legally the Government of Russia
cannot require the full divestiture of social assets from kolkhozes as in the case of
former state enterprises, including former state owned farms. Instead, the Govern-
ment of Russia's strategy is based on imposing restrictions for full privatization of
the social assets and encouraging kolkhozes and former kolkhozes to divest them.
In general, existing regulation regarding farms requires social assets to be excluded
from those farm assets that are the subject of distributing individual shares among
farm members. These social assets might be, but not must to be, transferred to
municipal ownership or become a part of a non-distributable fund of the farm under
restructuring. Housing might be transferred or sold to tenants.
22
22
Government Resolutions No. 86 of 12/29/91 and No. 708 of 9/4/92.
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(ii) Regional vs. federal ownership rights. The federal program of social asset divestiture
is focused on assets maintained by federally owned enterprises, which are, as a rule,
medium- and large-sized industrial enterprises located in urban areas. With few
exceptions, enterprises in agriculture are not, and have not been, federally owned
assets. This means that the Government of Russia has not committed to provide
funds to compensate regional budgets for additional costs related to divestiture
of rural social assets. As a result, the federal government is not in a position to
impose strong pressure on local authorities to accelerate rural divestiture, and local
administrations have strong scal disincentives to do so.
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Annex 4: Social Assets of the Vladimir Tractor Plant
As many large Russian enterprises, the Vladimir tractor plant used to provide a wide
range of social services before 1992. During 1992{94, the enterprise had been facing a
severe demand shock, which brought about a substantial reduction in both employment
and spending on maintenance of social assets. However, only a minor portion of these
assets (some kindergartens and sport facilities) was formally divested to the city in this
period. In 1994, the enterprise still spent on covering losses related to maintenance of these
assets more than 40% of its gross prot. However, it should be mentioned that all social
facilities listed below in Table 4.1, except housing stock, kindergartens, and educational
facilities, have been included into the founding capital of the enterprise and privatized
along with the productive assets. The management of the rm was not supposed to divest
such assets as dormitories, sport, entertainment, recreational and medical facilities, while
their maintenance costs amounted to almost a quarter of the entire spending on social
assets.
Table 4.2 presents the estimates of the potential nancial gain for the plant, which
might be associated with the full divestiture of social assets not included in its found-
ing capital. All other conditions with respect to nancial ows and taxation rules are
considered intact. The analysis shows that under the present regime, the plant enjoys
substantial prot tax benets, which oset more than 50% of the actual social spending.
However, given these exemptions, the net nancial gain for the plant from full divestiture
of housing and remaining kindergartens would be quite large, up to half of the actual
spending on maintenance of the whole stock of social assets or more than 20% of the
gross prot.
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Table 4.1: Spending on Maintenance of Social Assets by the Vladimir Tractor Plant in
1994, million rubles
Housing 4082
out of which: Dormitories* 850
Child care 1315
Sport facilities 108
Recreation facilities 160
Entertainment facilities 118
Medical unit 87
Education 41
Total Spending 5911
out of which: on assets subject to divestiture 4588
out of which: as % of the total 77.62
Spending credited against tax payments 5188
Spending as % of the total spending 87.77
Total Spending, as % gross prot 42.38
Memo:
Gross Prot 13948
Total Sales 834900
* Estimate.
Table 4.2: Potential Financial Impact of Divestiture
Before Divestiture, After Divestiture,
Actual Estimate
Spending on maintenance of social assets 5911 1323
out of which:
Spending credited against tax payments 5188 1000
Turnover tax payments 0 252
Prot tax exemptions ({) 1815.8 438.2
Net costs 4095.2 1136.8
Net costs as % of prot 29.36 8.15
Net gain from divestiture 2958.4
Net gain as % of the initial costs 50.05
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Table 1: Social Spending by the Enterprise Sector in Russia, in 1992{94 in Nominal and
Real Terms
1992 1993 1994
Social spending, total,
trillion rubles, current prices 0.739 5.36 21.12
 health n.a. 0.99 2.79
 education and culture n.a. 0.58 1.78
 housing, only maintenance n.a. 1.96 6.48
 investments n.a. n.a. 5.42
 other n.a. 1.83 4.65
Social spending, total, as % of GDP 3.89 3.13 3.46
Social spending, total, real, 1992 = 100 100 72.89 71.27
MEMO:
GDP, trillion rubles 19 171.5 611
CPI 14.54 9.95 4.03
Source: Goskomstat, estimates of the authors.
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Table 2: Social Spending by the Enterprise Sector in Russia, in 1993{94, trillion rubles
1993 1994
Agri- Agri-
Total Industry culture Total Industry culture
Social spending, total 5.36 3.47 0.43 21.12 12.99 1.564
 health care 0.99 0.64 0.086 2.79 1.93 0.126
 education and culture 0.58 0.41 0.047 1.78 1.29 0.159
 housing, only
maintenance 1.96 1.15 0.169 6.48 3.97 0.486
 investments n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.42 2.83 0.506
 other 1.83 1.27 0.128 4.65 2.97 0.287
MEMO:
Revenue from sales 184.2 107.6 9.52 607.77 357.68 25.61
Total costs
c
152.6 85.9 7.65 545.28 304.8 28.02
Prot from sales 31.2 21.8 2.06 62.49 47.37 -2.5
Total gross prot,
net losses 37.5 26.73 2.8 80.44 52.71 -0.32
Total wage bill,
with bonuses
a
32.22 15.72 3.41 105.36 49.41 8.87
Payroll tax
b
9.21 3.91 0.85 33.5 16 2.3
Budget expenditure on:
health care 5.43 27.45
education and culture 7.96 24.34
housing 6.6 28.67
Social spending as a
part of:
distributed prot
(para. 5), % 14.29 12.98 15.36 26.26 24.64 -488.75
total labor costs
(para. 6+7), % 12.94 17.68 10.09 15.21 19.86 14.00
wage bill (para. 6), % 16.64 22.07 12.61 20.05 26.29 17.63
Total labor costs with
social expenditure as
a part of total costs
(para. 3), % 30.66 26.89 61.34 29.34 25.72 45.45
Social spending as a
part of the total social
budget spending, %
 health care (para. 8) 18.23 10.16
 education and
culture (para. 9) 7.29 7.31
 housing (para. 10) 29.70 22.60
Notes:
a
As reported by Goskomstat in the form 10f;
b
Estimate;
c
Including VAT and Excises paid on
inputs.
Source: Goskomstat, estimates of the authors.
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Table 3: The Structure of Fixed Capital Assets at the Disposal of Russian Enterprises.
a
In Billion Rubles As % of Total
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
Stock of xed capital assets
b
7780 28539 37409 100 100 100
out of which:
 main(industrial) activities 7521 25418 33830 96.67 89.06 90.43
 non-productive activities 157 1051 1875 2.02 3.68 5.01
out of which:
housing 56 333 1038 0.72 1.17 2.77
utilities n.a. n.a. 250 n.a. n.a. 0.67
health n.a. n.a. 273 n.a. n.a. 0.73
education n.a. n.a. 141 n.a. n.a. 0.38
other n.a. n.a. 173 n.a. n.a. 0.46
Flow of new assets:
new construction 375 8541 100 100
out of which:
 main (industrial) activities 343 7131 91.47 83.49
 non-productive activities 26 950 6.93 11.12
out of which: housing 16 707 4.27 8.28
Divestiture of social assets
 all non-productive activities 10 253
out of which: housing 5 126
Notes:
a
Without agriculture;
b
By the end of the year.
Source: Goskomstat, estimates of the authors.
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Table 4: The Most and the Least Problematic Types of Benets as Assessed by Enterprise
Managers
Among 3 of the Most Among 3 of the Most
Dicult Benets Easy Benets to
to Provide Provide
Type of Benet (Number of Responses) (Number of Responses)
Kindergartens 15 0
Housing 10 0
Dormitories 7 0
Recreation facilities 5 0
Canteen with subsidized prices 5 3
Compensation for resort recreation 2 3
Sport facilities 2 4
Cultural center 1 0
Healthcare facilities 1 5
Food shop with subsidized prices 0 2
Transportation subsidy 0 2
Commodities on subsidized prices 0 6
Total number of responses: 24.
Source: Enterprise survey.
Table 5: Potential Consequences of Enterprise Housing Divestiture as Assessed by Enter-
prise Managers
Assessment of Consequences
Total Number (Number of Responses)
Issues of Responses Decrease Increase No Inuence
Financial burden 21 16 2 3
Managerial burden 21 19 0 2
Opportunities to hire workers 21 7 2 12
Prices 20 9 0 11
Source: Enterprise Survey.
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Table 6: Sources of Resistance to Enterprise Housing Divestiture as Assessed by Enterprise
Managers
YES NO
Resistance From the Side of: (Number of Responses) (Number of Responses)
Local administration 12 9
Enterprise insiders, 3 18
specically:
Enterprise managers 0 {
Trade union 1 {
Workers of housing maintenance
unit 2 {
Total number of responses: 21.
Source: Enterprise survey.
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Table 7: Conditions Included in Housing Divestiture Agreements Between Enterprises
and Municipalities
Were Considered as the Most
Dicult by Enterprise
Managers in Negotiations
Number of with Local Authorities
Conditions Agreements (Number of Responses)
Divestiture of housing in a good
technical shape 9 4
Divestiture of heat and hot water
supply systems 10 6
Divestiture of enterprise housing
maintenance units 10 4
Sharing maintenance costs 2 1
Sharing capital repair costs 4 2
Sharing utility costs 2 1
Continuation of housing maintenance
and capital repair at the expense
of the enterprise 2 1
Continuation of housing maintenance
and capital repair at the expense
of the municipality 5 {
Continuation of utility services
provision at the expense of the
enterprise 3 {
Continuation of utility services
provision at the expense of the
municipality 3 {
Total number of enterprises in the
process of housing divestiture 11
Source: Enterprise survey.
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